University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1995

Choosing the Law Governing Perfection: The Data
and Politics of Article 9 Filing
Steven L. Harris
Charles W. Mooney Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Harris, Steven L. and Mooney, Charles W. Jr., "Choosing the Law Governing Perfection: The Data and Politics of Article 9 Filing"
(1995). Minnesota Law Review. 2377.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2377

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Choosing the Law Governing Perfection:
The Data and Politics of Article 9 Filing
Steven L. Harris
Charles W. Mooney, Jr.*
In his valuable contribution to this Symposium, Lynn
LoPucki makes a case for revising Article 9 to provide that the
proper place for filing a financing statement against a corporate
debtor is the jurisdiction under whose law the debtor is incorporated.' He marshals data that provide powerful support for his
proposal and effectively blunt anticipated criticisms. We are
pleased to see this article, not only because we are inclined to
agree with its conclusion, but also because its appearance supports one of the strengths of the UCC revision process.
As LoPucki acknowledges, his article is a direct outgrowth
of a process that began with the establishment of the Permanent
Editorial Board UCC Article 9 Study Committee. 2 He first publicly floated the idea of an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule
* The authors are, respectively, Professor of Law, University of Illinois
College of Law, and Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
They serve as Reporters for the Drafting Committee to Revise UCC Article 9
("Drafting Committee") and were the Reporters for the Permanent Editorial
Board UCC Article 9 Study Committee ("Study Committee"). The views ex-

pressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Drafting Committee, the
Study Committee, or any of the sponsors of either (the Permanent Editorial
Board, the American Law Institute, or the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
1. Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of IncorporationShould Be
the ProperPlacefor Article 9 Filing A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REv. 577
(1995). Although LoPucki's proposal encompasses not only corporations but
also limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and other chartered entities ("registered entities"), his discussion proceeds primarily in the context of
corporate debtors. Id. at 581. We follow his practice.
2. Id. at 583-84. The Permanent Editorial Board established the Study
Committee in early 1990. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9: REPORT 1 (1992) [hereinafter PEB REPORT]. The Report describes the reasons for
and background of the study and the organization, operation, and general approach of the Committee. Id. at 1-9. The Study Committee recommended that
the UCC's sponsors create a drafting committee for the revision of Article 9. Id.
at 10-11. The sponsors responded positively and created the Drafting Committee in 1993. We expect that a revised Article 9 will be promulgated in 1997.
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in May 1993, at an Invitational Symposium sponsored by the
American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee
on Continuing Professional Education. LoPucki was among a
select group of established and knowledgeable practitioners and
academics who were invited to participate in a wide-ranging discussion of the Study Committee's Report.3 The primary purposes of the Report were to recommend to the sponsors of the
UCC whether Article 9 is in need of revision and, if so, to recommend the nature and substance of the revisions.4 But, as
LoPucki's article suggests, the Report served as well to stimu5
late discussion of various proposals for revision.
IMPROVING UPON ARTICLE 9's BIFURCATED
CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
The Study Committee's Report expressed dissatisfaction
with the current choice-of-law system. Under this system, the
law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located governs
perfection for most tangible collateral, whereas the law of the
jurisdiction where the debtor is located governs perfection for
most intangibles. 6 In explaining the desirability of a single
choice-of-law rule applicable to both tangible and intangible collateral, the Report observed that following two rules often results in multiple filings for a single transaction. 7 The two-rule
regime also jeopardizes security interests in proceeds and creates priority problems that a single rule would minimize and, in
some cases, even eliminate."
3. Because LoPucki is widely regarded as not terribly sympathetic to secured creditors, the mixed reaction his idea received is some indication that the
alleged "capture" of the revision process by representatives of secured parties is
overstated.
4. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
5. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 584. Discussions are continuing under the
auspices of the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute,
through the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
and various state and local bar associations, as well as among the advisors and
observers of the Drafting Committee.
6. "A debtor shall be deemed located at his place of business if he has one,
at his chief executive office if he has more than one place of business, otherwise
at his residence." U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d) (1990).
7. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 75. For example, financiers commonly
take a security interest in both inventory and accounts. The law of the location
of the collateral governs where to file a financing statement with respect to inventory. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(b). The law (including the conflict-of-laws rules) of
the jurisdiction where the debtor is located governs where to file with respect to
accounts. Id. § 9-103(3)(b).
8. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 75.
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Several considerations led the Study Committee to conclude
that the single choice-of-law rule should turn on the location of
the debtor and not the location of the collateral. 9 First, intangible collateral has no location. A location-of-collateral rule would
require a provision fixing a fictional location for intangibles. 10
Second, collateral may be located in many jurisdictions, whereas
each debtor has only one location (and, perhaps, one or two other
candidates for its location). As a consequence, a debtor's-location rule would likely result in fewer filings, thereby lowering
the cost of credit. Third, a debtor's-location rule probably would
not need special provisions governing collateral in transit.11 Finally, because debtors are unlikely to change locations as frequently as does collateral, a debtor-based rule would likely
reduce the costs of maintaining perfected status and the frequency with which certain difficult priority issues arise.
The Report candidly acknowledged that a single choice-oflaw rule based on the location of the debtor is not a complete
solution to choice-of-law problems, even though it would reduce
many costs and much complexity. 12 Because debtors sometimes
change their location, a debtor-based rule would not eliminate
all the costs and priority problems that accompany or result
from changes in the fact that determines the applicable law.
The Report also identified several problems that might accompany a shift from the current mixed choice-of-law regime (collateral- and debtor-based, depending on the type of collateral) to a
single, debtor-based rule. 13
CHOICE-OF-LAW BASED ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE
DEBTOR'S INCORPORATION
LoPucki approves of and builds upon the Study Committee's
recommendations that Article 9 be revised to provide a single
choice-of-law rule and that the rule be tied to the debtor, rather
than the collateral. 14 He brings to the discussion a new and im9. Id. at 76.
10. A rule that located intangibles at the debtor's location would replicate
the existing system.
11. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(c) (governing purchase money security interests in collateral that the parties understand will be kept in another state).
12. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 77.
13. Id. We discuss some of these problems. See infra notes 34-59 and accompanying text (discussing the variety of adverse implications associated with
the change to a debtor-based rule).
14. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, § 9.A- The Study Committee's recommendations were not novel. They were in accord with those of others who previously had considered the issue. See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WERmArRUB, CoMrARY
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portant twist, suggesting that the governing law be that of the
jurisdiction under whose law the debtor is incorporated rather
than the jurisdiction in which the debtor's chief executive office
is located.' 5 LoPucki does not limit his analysis to the question
of whether an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule is preferable to one based on the location of the debtor's chief executive
office. His paper also illuminates the larger question of the desirability of switching from a mixed choice-of-law regime to a
single choice-of-law rule.
At least insofar as it relates to the law governing perfection, 16 this larger choice-of-law question is, in turn, but one aspect of an overriding issue in the revision process: How to
minimize the aggregate costs of the filing system.1 7 LoPucki's
principal claim is that "It]he benefits of the change to an incorporation-based sysem will be principally in the form of lower total
systems costs and greater accuracy," and his proposal should be
assessed on this basis.1 8 We do not share LoPucki's concern that
a particular rule might permit filers to externalize certain costs
by shifting them to searchers, or vice versa.19 As a practical
matter, filers, searchers, and debtors are unable to bargain
among themselves to reallocate the costs of the filing system.
Regardless of how Article 9 allocates the costs between filers and
searchers, each group can shift the loss to its customers. Ultimately, debtors and potential debtors will bear both the costs of
ON THE CoNFIcr OF LAWS § 8.42, at 503-04 (3d ed. 1986) (promoting the merits
of a debtor-based rule); Peter F. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 477, 556-57 (1973) (arguing that a debtor-based rule would eliminate
problems created by the location-of-collateral approach); Friedrich K. Juenger,
NonpossessorySecurity Interests in American ConflictsLaw, 84 CoM. L.J. 63, 74
(1979) (advocating a debtor-based rule except for cars or fixtures).
15. LoPucki contrasts his proposal, filing "where the debtor is incorporated," with the current regime, under which one files "where the debtor is located" or "where the collateral is located." LoPucki, supra note 1, at 585-93.
Because the location of a corporation is a legal fiction, we would phrase the
issue in terms of whether Article 9 should deem a corporation to be located at
its chief executive office or in the jurisdiction of its incorporation.
16. Under § 9-103, the law governing perfection of security interests also
governs "the effect of perfection," which many understand to mean the relative
priority of a security interest as against other claims to the collateral. U.C.C.
§ 9-103(6) (1994). A 1994 amendment to § 9-103(6) distinguishes between the
law governing perfection and the law governing priority with respect to securities. Id.
17. The aggregate costs include those imposed upon both secured and unsecured creditors, as well as upon buyers and transferees of the collateral and
other interested persons who consult the UCC filing records.
18. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 652.
19. See id. at 601.
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filing (or choosing not to file) and the costs of searching (or deciding not to search). No advantage is necessarily gained by creating rules that, in the first instance, impose upon the filer the
costs of its own errors. The goal instead becomes one of reducing
the aggregate costs of both aspects of the filing system.
Cost reduction is not the only goal of the revision process.
The purpose of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), one of the sponsors of the UCC,
is "to promote uniformity in the law among the several
States."20 Especially in light of the general acceptance of existing Section 9-103,21 the Article 9 Drafting Committee is unlikely to approve any change to the section that it believes is
likely to impair significantly the chances of enactment or to re22
sult in non-uniform amendments.
The Study Committee's Report outlines some of the potential cost savings that might result from switching to a single
choice-of-law rule determined by the location of the debtor's
chief executive office. LoPucki argues, in essence, that an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule would afford all the benefits of
moving to a chief executive office rule and then some.
The advantages of linking the location of a corporate debtor
to its jurisdiction of incorporation rather than to its chief executive office cannot be denied. Once one has identified the debtor,
the jurisdiction of incorporation is certain and easy to confirm
from the public record; the location of the chief executive office is
less certain
and depends on private facts that may be costly to
3
verify.

2

20. CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMSSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS § 1.2 (1988).

21. There have been very few nonuniform amendments to § 9-103.
22. Among NCCUSL's policies is the following: "(a) Every act drafted by
the Conference shall conform to the following requirements: ... (2) there shall
be a reasonable probability that the act, when approved, either will be accepted
and enacted into law by a substantial number of jurisdictions or, if not, will
promote uniformity indirectly." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFoRM STATE LAws, STATEMENT OF POLICY ESTABLISI3NG CRITERIA AND PRO-

CEDURES FOR DESIGNATION AND CONSIDERATION OF ACTS I 2(a)(2) (1988). To the

extent that nonuniformity imposes net costs, the goal of uniformity is one aspect of the goal of cost reduction.

23. LoPucki makes much of this uncertainty, some of which the official
comment creates. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 594-97. The Study Committee's
Report acknowledged the uncertainty but observed that "[a]lthough the term
[chief executive office] is not defined, the lack of definition does not appear to
have caused significant problems." PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 76 n.8. Presumably, the uncertainty, whatever its degree, could be ameliorated by carefully redrafting the statute and the official comments. Nevertheless, LoPucki's
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POST-TRANSACTION CHANGES UNDER AN
INCORPORATION-BASED CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
The incorporation-based system may not be quite so simple
as it first appears. For example, the rule may have to take account of corporations that dissolve. Because the consequences of
dissolution differ from state to state, a complex provision may be
needed to deal with the variations. As LoPucki suggests, an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule is likely to be useful not
24
only for corporations but also for other "registered entities."
More thought must be given to the applicability of the "jurisdiction of incorporation" rule to entities other than state-chartered
corporations. 2 5 In particular, care must be taken to assure that
no "registered entity" can be chartered by more than one jurisdiction. And, unless Congress establishes a federal filing system
for federally chartered entities, the choice-of-law rule governing
security interests created by some registered entities will differ
from that governing security interests created by others. 2 6 In
any event, the definition of "registered entity" will raise some
questions at the margin. These and other issues deserve further
study; we suspect, however, that they will prove trivial when
compared with the increased certainty that would result from
abandoning the chief executive office as a determinant of the applicable law.
We agree with LoPucki that the costs of discovering and responding to changes in the jurisdiction whose law governs
perfection are likely to be lower in an incorporation-based system than under a rule that turns on the location of the debtor's
chief executive office. A change in the jurisdiction of incorpora27
tion is a matter of public record and occurs at a definite time.
point is well taken: The jurisdiction of incorporation is more certain and easier
to verify than is any undefined "chief executive office" or any redefined "chief
executive office."
24. For a working definition of "registered entity," see LoPucki, supra note
1, at 581 n.12.
25. The 1977 amendments to § 9-103 use the phrase "jurisdiction of organization." See U.C.C. § 9-103(6) (1977). One of the new choice-of-law provisions
applicable to securities uses the phrase "jurisdiction under which the issuer of
the security is organized." U.C.C. § 8-110(d) (1994).
26. It will be necessary to specify the applicable law in the case of federallychartered entities. We think it unlikely, however, that states would adopt a
uniform text that deems a specified jurisdiction (say, Washington, D.C.) to be
the home of all federally-chartered entities. Another alternative for federallychartered entities would be the jurisdiction where the chief executive office is
located, as under current UCC § 9-103(3).
27. Following LoPucki, we use the phrase "change in the jurisdiction of incorporation" to refer to a reincorporation. Although the purpose and practical
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A debtor may change its chief executive office through the accretion of otherwise insignificant private events, thus making the
moment of change-a legally significant event-impossible to
pinpoint. 28 An incorporation-based rule may reduce significantly the monitoring costs that arise from the current need to
debtor relocates its chief executive office or
reperfect if the
29
reincorporates.
To some degree, our assessment of these monitoring costs
differs from LoPucki's. For example, we agree that an incorporation-based rule could eliminate the need to monitor for corporate restructurings, but we think that revisions to Article 9
would be insufficient to accomplish that goal. LoPucki assumes
that the change in choice-of-law rules would be accompanied by
a revised section 9-402(7), under which a filed financing statement would remain effective if the debtor corporation changes
its name or even merges out of existence.3 0 He suggests that
this new rule would eliminate the need for a secured party who
files properly in the jurisdiction of incorporation to monitor for
subsequent mergers. 31 But a merger, particularly one in which
the debtor merges out of existence, poses risks that may dwarf
the loss of perfected status. Even if a filing were to remain effective following a reincorporation, secured parties would be likely
to take steps to discover whether the debtor has merged. These
steps might include checking the publicly available corporate
records periodically to discover whether particular debtors had
undergone corporate changes.
An incorporation-based choice-of-law rule might facilitate
the transmission of relevant information to secured parties and
thereby obviate the need for periodic searches, a point that
LoPucki seems to overlook. For example, once a state links its
corporate and UCC records, the filing office might, for a fee, roueffect of a reincorporation are to change the domicile of a corporation, as a legal
matter a reincorporation consists of the organization of a new corporation and
the subsequent merger of the old corporation into the new. Legally, the old
corporation does not change its jurisdiction of incorporation; rather, it ceases to
exist. The new (surviving) corporation remains liable for debts incurred by the
old one.
28. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 590-91.
29. Id. at 611-14. The incorporation-based system also provides a means
for error trapping. Id. at 603.
30. Id. at 614. Although LoPucki treats a reincorporation as a name
change, a reincorporation terminates the existence of an original corporation.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the legal effect of
reincorporation). We prefer to think of reincorporations not as name changes
but rather as transfers of collateral.
31. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 611-14.
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tinely notify the secured party of record that its debtor plans to
merge. Or corporate law might be amended to accomplish the
same result indirectly. If, for example, the law prevented a proposed merger from taking effect until outstanding financing
statements are terminated, the debtor would have little choice
but to inform the secured party prior to merging. Alternatively,
the effectiveness of a proposed merger could be conditioned upon
refiling the outstanding financing statements against the surviving corporation.
Although LoPucki does not address mergers generally, the
incorporation-based choice-of-law rule he proposes may help resolve some perfection issues that arise in that context. Despite
having devoted substantial time, the Study Committee was unable to reach a consensus on whether a financing statement filed
against the debtor should remain effective with respect to collateral that a surviving corporation acquires after merging with
the non-surviving debtor.3 2 Part of the Committee's disagreement stemmed from diverging views over whether to impose
upon a post-merger lender to the surviving entity the burden of
discovering a financing statement filed against the now-defunct
debtor, or whether to impose upon the lender to the debtor the
burden to discover that its borrower has merged out of existence
and to correct the UCC records. Those with concern for the
searcher note that although the merger and the identity of the
debtor (including its state of incorporation) may be part of the
public record, the location of the debtor's chief executive office,
where a relevant financing statement might be filed, is not.
Under an incorporation-based regime, however, the burden on
potential3 3lenders to the surviving entity would be considerably
reduced.
As with initial filings, the benefits of an incorporation-based
rule with respect to maintaining perfected status are apparent.
There are, however, some disadvantages. Chief among them is
that an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule may engender
complex substantive rules that depend on whether the debtor is
a registered entity, or a particular type of registered entity. For
example, LoPucki suggests that an incorporation-based rule
would obviate the need to refile when the debtor corporation
32. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, §§ 17.E-F. This question assumes that a
security has attached to the property acquired after the merger.
33. The fact that UCC filings vastly outnumber searches of the UCC
records, see LoPucki, supra note 1, at 615, also argues for imposing the burden
on lenders to the survivor rather than on those who have filed against the
debtor.
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changes its name; presumably, the need to refile to maintain
perfected status would remain with respect to debtors other
than registered entities. 3 4 Similarly, under an incorporationbased rule, a refiling might not be necessary following a
reincorporation, whereas it might be required in analogous situ35
ations, such as the incorporation of a limited partnership.
These potential statutory wrinkles, although worthy of note, are
offset the obvious
unlikely to impose costs substantial enough3 to
6
advantages of an incorporation-based rule.
FROM A MIXED CHOICE-OF LAW REGIME TO A DEBTORBASED SYSTEM: POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND
LIKELIHOOD OF NONUNIFORMITY
LoPucki's article is not limited to the question of whether an
incorporation-based rule is preferable to one based on the
debtor's chief executive office. The article also provides a useful
analysis and supporting data that are likely to aid the Drafting
Committee in evaluating the larger questions: Are the anticipated benefits of a shift from a mixed choice-of-law regime to a
single debtor-based rule (whether keyed to jurisdiction of incorporation or to chief executive office) likely to exceed the expected
costs? Will the state legislatures enact a proposed uniform incorporation-based choice-of-law rule?
The Study Committee's Report raised the uniformity issue
by observing that a single choice-of-law rule based upon the
debtor's chief executive office "may affect dramatically the volume of filings in many jurisdictions. The perceived effect may be
so great as to engender opposition among filing officers in particular jurisdictions."3 7 Switching to an incorporation-based system poses the issue in even starker terms. The immediate
reaction of virtually everyone with whom we have shared
LoPucki's proposal is the same: Delaware will experience a flood
34. The Study Committee contemplated that a new filing generally would
be needed to continue perfected status following name changes. See PEB REPORT, supra note 2, §§ 17.B-C. The Drafting Committee generally has followed
the Study Committee's approach.
35. The "incorporation of a partnership," like a reincorporation, is a transfer of assets from one entity to another.
36. The tension between drawing fine, but complex, lines and effectuating
rough justice is a problem that is not unique to choice-of-law issues. See Steven
L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study Committee Report:
Strong Signals and Hard Choices, 29 IDAHo L. REv. 561, 577-80 (1992-93) (discussing the tension between developing a complex set of rules to create certainty of commercial law and maintaining clarity and accessibility).
37. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, § 9.A.2.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:663

of filings, at the expense of other states. Not so long ago, when
Louisiana was considering adopting Article 9, the effort to replace Louisiana's parish-based recording system with a statewide filing system was met with potent, and ultimately
successful, opposition from local filing officers. Many fear that
state filing officers would mount the38same opposition to the proposed change in choice-of-law rules.
Everyone recognizes that, to some extent, this issue is "amenable to empirical clarification."3 9 Unlike the rest of us, however, LoPucki began the clarification process. He deserves
immeasurable credit for compiling and analyzing the data.
Even if his empiricism fails to carry the day, LoPucki has performed a valuable service by informing what otherwise would
have been debate premised entirely upon speculation.
LoPucki's data suggest that other states would lose to Delaware, on average, about five percent of their filings, with an esti40 We
mated annual revenue approaching two million dollars.
cannot predict whether the data will persuade an otherwise dubious filing officer that fears of losing substantial revenue to Delaware are unwarranted. The sticking point ultimately may turn
out to be perception rather than fact. We would not be surprised
to hear that some filing officers "just can't believe" that the loss
of revenue to Delaware would be as small as LoPucki projects.
Moreover, the losses that LoPucki projects are averages; some
states, such as those that impose a tax on filings, might expect to
incur a larger than average loss. 41 Although LoPucki may well
be correct that thwarting the imposition of documentary taxes
by moving to an incorporation-based system would be a good result for the Article 9 system, officials in states that impose a tax
might vigorously oppose the change nonetheless.
The potential redistribution of revenue is not the only problem; a reduction in the aggregate number of filings in the UCC
records will accompany the change from a mixed choice-of-law
system to a single, debtor-based choice-of-law rule. For example, inventory financers who now must perfect by filing in each
jurisdiction where collateral is located would be able to perfect
by making a single filing in the jurisdiction of incorporation.
38. One person has questioned whether Delaware's filing system has the
capacity to process so many more fiings.
39. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 584.
40. Id. at 639.
41. See id. at 630-32.
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From a cost-savings perspective, the reduction in filings seems
desirable. But politically, it may add fuel to the fire.4 2
The stakes here are much higher than those in the battle
between state and local filing offices within a state. 4 3 Maintaining different rules on where to file within a state is far from an
ideal situation. It imposes information-gathering costs on those
who use the filing system. The third alternative Section 9401(1) may require the additional expense of a second filing
within a single state. Putting aside statutory ambiguities, however, one can definitively determine "where to file" no matter
which filing office or offices each state designates."4 Not so if
disgruntled filing officers convince particular states not to adopt
the proposed uniform choice-of-law rule. With non-uniform
choice-of-law rules, in many cases no one will know in advance
which state's law determines whether a security interest is
45
perfected.
Yet LoPucki flags a potentially even greater problem. Because corporate debtors often can change their domicile more
easily than their chief executive office, jurisdictions that adopt
the uniform incorporation-based choice-of-law rule might compete for incorporations by enacting non-uniform substantive
rules favorable to secured parties. 46 To some extent, the uniform version could reduce the effect of this nonuniformity by divorcing the law governing perfection from the law governing
42. In the absence of filing data from all 50 states, it may be impossible to
estimate the number of filings that would be eliminated by moving to a single
choice-of-law rule.
43. The three alternative § 9-401(1) provide a menu from which each state
may choose how much local filing it wishes. LoPucld argues for elimination of
local filing except for real estate related collateral such as fixtures. LoPucki,
supra note 1, at 657. As far as we are aware, no individual or group favors
retention of local filing, other than one with a direct or indirect interest in the
revenues that local filing generates.
44. We do not mean to trivialize the uncertainty costs caused by ambiguities in the existing formulation of the three alternatives to § 9-401(1). For a
discussion of the ambiguities, see, e.g., BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.12, at 2-144 to 2-149
(rev. ed. 1993); JAMEs J. WmTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIL
CODE § 22-14 (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993).
45. For examples of how this uncertainty can come about, see LoPucki,
supra note 1, at 646-47.
46. For example, a state might delete § 9-301(1), which subordinates unperfected security interests to the rights of certain lien creditors, buyers, and
transferees. AMERicAN LAw INSTITUTE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED
ARTICLE 8. INvEST ENqT SECURITIES (WITH AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 9.
CURED TRANsACTIONS) (Proposed Final Draft 1994).

SE-
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priorities. 4 7 But this solution, which could exacerbate the
problems of conflicting priority rules, is far from ideal.
To date, individual states have largely refrained from
adopting non-uniform Article 9 choice-of-law provisions. The
change to an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule presents two
risks: nonuniformity resulting from particular states refusing
to shift to an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule, and
nonuniformity resulting from particular states adopting nonuniform rules of substantive law in an effort to attract corporations. Whether those risks warrant rejection of what otherwise
may be a desirable rule is a determination the Drafting Committee ultimately will have to make. LoPucki's article enables them
to make it with at least some factual basis.
TRANSITION PROBLEMS
Related to the problem of nonuniformity in legislative enactments of Section 9-103 or particular substantive provisions of
Article 9 is the nonuniformity that results from delays in adopting statutory revisions. Nonuniformity of this kind has
presented problems in the past and will likely do so in the future. 48 Even if all states adopt the uniform version to take effect
on the same effective date, transition provisions would be necessary to deal with the status of financing statements that were
properly filed but not in the jurisdiction of incorporation. We
commend LoPucki for tackling this problem, and, notwithstanding the federal government's uneven efforts in this regard, 49 we
urge all concerned to keep an open mind about a federal choice47. New Article 9 draws this distinction. Compare, e.g., § 9-103(6)(b)

(1994) (providing that local law generally governs perfection and priority of a
security interest in a security certificate located in the jurisdiction) with § 9103(6)(f) (providing that the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located governs perfection by certain methods).
48. For example, § 9-103 was amended in 1977 to provide that the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction of organization ofthe issuer
governs perfection of a security interest in an uncertificated security. The 1972
version provided that perfection of a security interest in the same collateral is
governed by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction in
which the debtor is located. The 1994 version contains a set of choice-of-law
rules that differs from both. See U.C.C. §§ 8-110, 9-103(6) (1994).
49. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., GoodFaith Transfereesof U.S. Treasury Securities and Other Weird Ideas: Making Federal Commercial Law, 26
Loy. LA. L. REv. 715 (1993) (criticizing the United States Treasury Department!s efforts to promulgate new regulations covering book-entry Treasury
securities).
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of-law statute. 50 Indeed, if federal intervention appears likely,
NCCUSL might seek to delay legislative consideration
of revised
51
section 9-103 until Congress has acted.
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS
Another issue that may have implications for uniformity as
well as for cost reduction is the effect of an incorporation-based
system on purchase money financing of equipment. The Study
Committee expressed concern that:
[a] change to the "location-of-the-debtor" [i.e., chief executive office]
rule might require certain financers to teach their personnel how to
determine where the debtor is located (a determination that may be
considerably more difficult than determining where the newly-acquired collateral is) and how to prepare and file financing statements
that satisfy the statutory
and regulatory requirements of a larger
52
number of jurisdictions.

LoPucki suggests that determining the applicable law by reference to the jurisdiction of incorporation rather than the chief executive office would ameliorate the problem substantially. The
jurisdiction of incorporation is verifiable from the public record
and is information that many purchase money financers obtain
in the ordinary course of extending credit. Nevertheless, some
purchase money financers have displayed the same concern
about the costs of an incorporation-based
rule that the Study
53
Committee expressed in its Report.
LoPucki reports that "[mIany, if not most, UCC filings are
purchase money security interests created at the time a manufacturer or dealer sells the collateral to an end user or retailer."5 4 Reducing filing costs for purchase money financers,
both lenders and sellers, would therefore be a particularly effec50. For example, under the Market Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101432, § 5, 104 Stat. 963, 973-75, amending § 17a of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1, the Securities and Exchange Commission has the
power to issue preemptive federal regulations concerning the transfer and
pledge of interests in securities. One alternative currently under consideration
by the Market Transactions Advisory Committee (established under the Market Reform Act of 1990) is a federal choice-of-law rule.
51. Congress might, at the same time, create a filing system for federally
chartered registered entities.
52. PEB REPORT, supra note 2, at 77.
53. These concerns, which have been expressed to us privately and at
Drafting Committee meetings, go not only to the costs attendant to the transition from one choice-of-law rule to another but also to the costs of operating
under the incorporation-based rule.
54. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 587. A purchase money financer can obtain
priority over a competing security interest in the same equipment even if the
competing secured party is first to file its financing statement. See U.C.C. § 9-
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five means of reducing the aggregate costs of the filing system.
LoPucki suggests that the jurisdiction of incorporation may be
less costly to ascertain than the location of the collateral, but his
discussion proceeds on the assumption that "the careful secured
party will want to look at them to be sure they are in the
state."55 In fact, as a general matter, purchase money financers
often do not incur the costs associated with visiting the debtor's
premises to verify the location of collateral. Apparently they do
not perceive a substantial risk in relying upon the debtor for this
information. 5 6 Nevertheless, the cost of verifying the jurisdiction in which the debtor is incorporated may well be less than
the costs of being unperfected when the debtor turns out to have
given incorrect information. Moreover, the switch to a single
rule, whether based on incorporation or on chief executive office,
whether goods are "ordiwould eliminate any need to determine
57
nary goods" or "mobile goods."
Determining where to file is not the end of the inquiry.
Purchase money financers also must incur the costs of discovering and complying with the filing requirements of the appropriate jurisdiction. Here, LoPucki's data suggest that a change in
the choice-of-law determinant from the current mixed system to
an incorporation-based system would result in a small (less than
three percent) increase in the number of out-of-state filings
against corporations. 58 More refined data, which segregate
purchase money equipment filings, might show a somewhat different picture. Moreover, LoPucki's analysis treats every out-ofstate filing as equivalent, regardless of which states are involved
in the transaction. An equipment dealer in Kansas City, Missouri, might, however, not be indifferent between filing in Kansas and filing in New York.
312(4) (1994). Thus, purchase money secured parties typically do not search
the UCC records.
The extent to which the prevalence of purchase money filings accounts for
the significant disparity between the number of filings and the number of
searches is an empirical question well worth pursuing.
55. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 593.
56. One can imagine a class of sellers whose business is entirely local, such
that there is at best a trivial risk that the buyer will remove the goods to another state.
57. Under § 9-103(1)(b), the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is
located governs perfection of a security interest in "ordinary goods," as defined
in § 9-103(1)(a). In contrast, § 9-103(3)(b) provides that the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located governs perfection of a security interest in "mobile goods," as defined in § 9-103(3)(a).
58. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 608.
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The largest cost associated with an out-of-state filing probably is the cost of determining how to comply with the peculiar
formal requirements for an effective financing statement. Some
of these requirements, such as minimum type size, have been
created administratively by filing officers. Even nonuniform
statutory requirements, such as the need for a tax identification
number, impose additional costs on filers. The most efficient solution, and one that the Drafting Committee is considering, may
be the development of a standard form of financing statement
that every jurisdiction will accept for filing.
Finally, purchase money financers have expressed concern
about maintaining perfection if the circumstances that determine the applicable law change after a financing statement has
been filed. Arguably, the movement of collateral is easier to spot
than the relocation of a chief executive office, let alone a
reincorporation, which is largely a paper transaction. But, as
discussed above, an incorporation-based
system can address this
59
problem in one or more ways.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with the Study Committee's recommendation, a
consensus within the Drafting Committee has emerged in favor
of a single debtor-based choice-of-law rule for Article 9 filing.
Professor LoPucki's article pushes the envelope beyond that consensus. He has fashioned a cogent and articulate proposal for
an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule based on careful analysis, sound assumptions, and empirical data. That proposal also
appears to have found preliminary support within the Drafting
Committee. To be sure, some underbrush stands between
LoPucki's proposal and statutory enactment; in this Commentary we have sought to illuminate it and clear some of it away.
But as Reporters for the Article 9 revision project, we appreciate
enormously the path that Professor LoPucki has opened.

59. For example, Article 9 might provide that refiling is not required if the
debtor merges into another corporation; state corporate law might require notification of secured parties as a condition to merger; state filing offices might
agree to notify secured parties of mergers; or private search services might undertake to monitor corporate records to discover mergers. See supra notes 3033 and accompanying text (exploring alternative methods of reducing the burden on secured parties under an incorporation-based choice-of-law rule).

